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1. Social policy: Matter of national or international legislation?
More than 10 years ago the United Nations’ (= UN) Convention for the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD) was incorporated into the legislation of many UN mem-
ber states worldwide. It outlines explicitly and specifically the human rights of persons 
with disabilities and makes the states responsible to align their legal provisions on so-
cial protection for persons with handicaps to the human rights’ guarantees stipulated 
by and in the UNCRPD. 
In Germany since the UNCRPD’s has come into force, a legal and political debate 
emerged on its impact on schooling and the working conditions of severely handicapped 
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persons. These persons were traditionally educated in special schools, and after having 
left school most of them did not work on the general labour market, but were active 
in “sweatshops for handicapped persons” (Werkstätten für Menschen mit Behinderung). 
Sheltered schooling and work were the orthodox answers of German social policy to 
protect persons with handicaps. 
Albeit the overriding goal of the UNCRPD is the inclusion of persons with handi-
caps, i.e. their integration into the general social life; schools and the labour market 
stand for it. Sheltered schooling and jobs in special institutions are, therefore, prone to 
discriminate against persons with disabilities. If this should be true, what does it mean 
for the German legislation? 
The debate touches upon fundamental questions of national labour law making in 
an international legal order, built upon socio-economic human rights. Why are the 
states bound in their national social policy to observe international labour and social 
welfare or security law (II)? The answer requires a broad look back to more then two 
centuries history of constitutional human rights and their transformation into interna-
tional guarantees. Article 27 of the UNCRPD ascertains a right to work to persons with 
a handicap. What does this provide for (III) and what are the consequences of this right 
for severlely handicapped persons, if they work till today in special institutions called 
“sweatshop for severely handicapped persons” (IV)?
2. Human rights: National or international guarantees?
2.1. Emergence of human rights in the 18th century 
The history of human rights did not follow a straight path. The persons, to which these 
rights apply, and the content of these rights changed substantially, since they were pro-
claimed the first time in the United States and France at the end of the 18th century. This 
came in the form of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (déclara-
tions des droits de l’homme et du citoyen) rooted first and foremost in natural rights 
and the ensuing justifications stemming from the general nature of man. Despite the 
natural law rhetoric, they initially applied de jure only to a small, distinctively elite cad-
re of property-owning men, who were citizens of the state that was guaranteeing those 
rights. The state was strapped for funds at the time and needed each of them as tax-
payers, providing compensation with human rights in turn.1 Such rights were aimed at 
protection through participation in the body politic. Initially, they were granted only 
to “citizens” who owned property and, as a result, paid taxes. In contrast, this excluded 
1 The maxims of revolution were derived from Locke [1689], p. 140—a revolution which, when ex-
amined in detail, constituted a taxpayers’ revolt: “No taxation without representation!” Qu’est-ce que, le 
tiers-état ? These statements associated with the revolutions underscore the calls for political participa-
tion asserted by holders of wealth subjected to taxation.
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the overwhelming majority, consisting of those without property, women and foreign-
ers; therefore, these groups were initially outside the scope of human rights. 
From the outset, these rights promised individual liberty among equals (Bloch 1972, 
p. 76). Thus, they were created and designed to allow every human being to do as they 
wished (Bloch 1972, Note 2, p. 176; also see Luhmann 1974, p. 32). That is why this lib-
erty could not remain a privilege over the long term. The development of human rights 
since that time must initially and primarily be considered an expansion of personal 
scope and applicability over several centuries, but the actual content has changed as well.
The 19th century was marked by the “social question” of overcoming the lack of rights 
for classes not holding property. The essential and vital interests of socio-economic hu-
man rights attained prominence for the first time. By integrating workers, they became 
holders of civil (right of association) and political (right to vote) human rights; both 
of which thus provided the conditions for freedom of association, geared towards the 
needs of workers and serving their interests, and social insurance to become their own 
human rights.
The end of the 19th century saw the beginnings of the women’s rights movement, 
which began to take hold in the 20th century. The idea of equal rights for men and wom-
en strives to overcome the historical division of labour between the sexes and the re-
sulting legal, political, social and economic allocations of tasks that have emerged and 
the associated unequal treatment of women in relation to men. 
2.2. International turn of human rights
Since 1948, human rights have no longer been simply rooted in the constitutional laws 
of countries, but they are also enshrined in international law which must be observed 
and respected throughout the world. International human rights are closely linked with 
the formation and goals of the UN. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
claimed in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris on 10 December 1948 (Prost, Winter 2011, 
p. 269) emerged from the experience of war, destruction and genocide due to and dur-
ing World War II. It was written in response to gross, overt violations of human rights 
and the impotence of international organizations towards dictatorial regimes with dis-
regard and contempt for human rights that characterized the interwar period. 
The story of Franz Bernheim epitomizes the problem. Franz Bernheim was a German 
citizen of Jewish descent who fled from Gliwice (part of Germany at the time) to Prague. 
In 1933, he petitioned the League of Nations regarding the persecution of Jews occur-
ring in Germany ever since the Nazis had taken power in January 1933. He criticized 
the poor treatment of Jewish Germans as a violation of the Convention of 15 May 1922 
regarding Upper Silesia that had been initiated by the League of Nations as a protec-
tive measure intended to safeguard equal treatment in civil society for minorities (Ball-
Kaderni 1963, pp. 185–199; Graf 2008, pp. 129 ff). 
The German National Socialist leadership protested against this sort of interfer-
ence in allegedly “internal” affairs, which it deemed illegitimate. At the same time, the 
Eberhard Eichenhofer
16
German foreign policy utilized delaying tactics in an effort to prevent a legal investi-
gation into the persecution of Jews in Germany and by Germany at the international 
level. The League of Nations insisted on its request to review and safeguard the protec-
tion of human rights even within states (Graf 2008, Note 5, pp. 220 ff). The issue be-
came irrelevant once Germany announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations 
on 16 October 1933. This sort of defensive attitude equated human rights with civil 
rights and considered both to be an expression of the sovereign nation-state. This atti-
tude fed the misconception that each nation-state may define, shape and allot human 
rights under its own authority.
The dictatorial regimes never once considered the struggle for human rights nothing 
else but a sort of humanitarian rhetoric, which is conceived as an idealized observation 
of the reality, primarily conceived as being nasty and brutish; they derided complaints 
made by states belonging to international organizations because of human rights viola-
tions as unsolicited interference in their internal affairs. In light of this, the UN must be 
viewed as an attempt to base the post-war world order on basic human freedoms and to 
allow everyone to experience them. As a follow-up to the four fundamental freedoms 
identified by US president Franklin D. Roosevelt (Roosevelt 1944, pp. 663 ff), freedom 
of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear, social rights 
also form a focal point for all of the guarantees of human rights.2 It was given the re-
sponsibility of deepening international trade and monetary policy and, finally, protect-
ing human rights. This is the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). According to Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the US President and one of the three 
authors,3 it should be treated as an international bill of rights (Glendon 2000, p. XV). 
The internationally proclaimed human rights are thereby intended to form the prin-
ciples to serve as a means of orientation for future global policies and so that all peo-
ples and nations may set a common standard for achievements in human rights. First 
and foremost, the human right means the right to have rights and to be considered an 
independent being and not as a means towards other purposes (Beitz 2009, p. 1). The 
core of such a guarantee is that the dignity of every human being must be recognized, 
every human being must receive all human rights (Arendt 1960) and every state must 
ultimately ensure they are upheld.
As evidenced in its preamble, the UDHR was created with due consideration because 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all mem-
bers of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” 
and “a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest impor-
tance for the full realization of this pledge.” It sees the foundation of all human rights 
in the dignity of every human being. Extensive precepts towards equal treatment and 
2 Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter from 1941 set forth the war objectives of the Western Allies. 
Among them was the post-war aim “that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want.”
3 The others are Charles Malik (Lebanon) and René Cassin (France).
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bans on discrimination are intended to safeguard this freedom in totality for all ben-
eficiaries. The idea that human rights are an expression of state sovereignty has never 
been successful in promoting understanding of human rights. Ultimately, all human 
rights limit state authority at a basic level and they direct the states towards the realiza-
tion of individual liberty through law. 
2.3. Socio-economic human rights
As the full spectrum of human rights acknowledged in international law, among them 
above all the basic social human rights to work, education, health, accommodation, so-
cial insurance or social assistance (Art. 22–26 UDHR). In this vein, Art. 53 of the Charter 
of the United Nations puts forth raising the standard of living, full employment as well 
as social and economic progress in and through international cooperation (free-trade, 
in other words) as goals of the post-war period. Article 68 of the Charter of the United 
Nations provided for a separate Economic and Social Council. 
Socio-economic rights draw the lesson from the insight, that human rights are not 
embedded in the muman nature, but should characterise the human society. “Human 
rights are not the rights of humans in a state of nature; they are rights of humans in 
society . . . rights of humans vis-à-vis each other” (Hunt 2007, p. 21). They are built on 
the assumption that all humans in a given society or beyond the latter all human beings 
living worldwide accept one another as free and equal individuals (Hunt 2007, Note 13, 
p. 29). Insofar are all human rights “social” by nature, as they determine the position 
of individuals in their mutual relation to one another (Barak-Erez, Gross 2007, p. 7).
By amplifying the personal scope of human rights to universal one, human rights 
had been also enriched in substance and adopted new spheres of social life. New topics 
became palpable for them. The property right of the employer made a capitalist econo-
my possible and lawful. But the property right for the employer raised the question on 
whether it encompasses the person of the employee. In the early phase of the industrial 
development the workers suffered from meagre wages, long working hours, unhealthy 
working conditions and child labour was common with detrimental effects on the workers’ 
health, when becoming adults. Workers associated and contracted collectively with the 
employer on their wages and work conditions. Collective actions emerged; they should 
compensate the weak stance an individual worker had, when he tried to contract indi-
vidually. Labour law developed by collective actions and legislation and brought about 
employees’ rights to counterbalance the employers’ power embedded in their property 
on the means of production. It became clear, that the human rights of employers can-
not derogate the workers rights; which had been established step by step in the 19th and 
20th century and finally acknowledged as fundamental social human rights.
The Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919, was—apart from the Mexico Constitution 
of 1917 and the Constitution of Finland of 1919—one of the first constitutions of the 
World, which did provide for fundamental social human rights. In the Constitution—
committed to foster “social progress”—the political changes of the decades before and 
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during WW I should be articulated in a broad and comprehensive catalogue of eco-
nomic, social and cultural human rights: The economic life should coincide with the 
principles of social justice and follow the aim to guarantee a life in human dignity to 
each human being (Art. 151). Human labour has to be protected by a unified labour 
law (Art. 157). The freedom of association and collective bargaining is guaranteed to 
both employees and employers (Art. 159). The right to social insurance (Art. 161) was 
guaranteed, and it was stated, that irrespective of the individual freedom each citizen is 
exposed to the moral commitment, to utilize her/his physical or intellectual capability 
for the common good. Under there auspices each citizen should have a right to work in 
order to acquire his or her personal maintenance (Art. 163). Employees are entitled to 
take part in the question of enterprises. For this purpose, works councils shall be estab-
lished on the level of a factory, the enterprise, or on regional or national level (Art. 165).
Thomas Paine wrote in his treatise on The Rights of Men (Paine 1791) a theory on 
human rights, which emphasized the social rights. He assumed, that the state’s role is 
to protect and to unfold the rights and liberties of all individuals. This task implies to 
teach the younger and to protect the older generation. He advocated for progressive 
taxation, public assistance and a public insurance against all risks human life is exposed 
to. If affluence is the outcome of joint work, all contributors have a right to a fair share 
(Sièyes 1985, p. 27; Gauchet 1991, p. 111). 
It combines equality with the state’s role to protect human dignity and liberties. On 
the assumption of factual inequality and diversity of humankind human rights should 
safeguard to each one to bring about a fair share free of any discrimination. The eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights address stake—holding in a given society by measur-
ing it in economic, social and cultural participation. For Helmut Schmidt the welfare 
state was the greatest achievement of Europeans in the 20th century.4
In the international understanding, human rights are not only supposed to deter-
mine a negative freedom (Berlin 1969)—a lat. status negativus5— which should leave 
open to each individual a sphere for choice and action free from any state intervention, 
but should also create the positive freedom of the individual—a lat. status positivus. 
This freedom is based on entitlements against public institutions, e.g. employment ser-
vices, schools, city councils, social insurance administrations or the health services, or 
privates, above all the employer, which have to bring about and make practically feasi-
ble specific social rights. 
The leading idea of negative freedom as a status free of state intervention is an inad-
equate and insufficient determination of human freedom for an interventionist state: 
“Freedom from the law’s coercion is an instrumental, not an ultimate good” (MacCormick 
1982, pp. 1, 10). The leading idea behind positive freedom addresses the potentials for 
a life in self-determination: “The notion of freedom as effective power to achieve what 
one would choose is an important part of the general idea of freedom” (Sen 1992, p. 69).
4 “Die Zeit” 2006, Bd. 40, p. 3.
5 This doctrine stems from: Jellinek 1905, 1960, 2011, pp. 94 ff, 114 ff, 136 ff.
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International human rights are the global community’s response to one of the three 
fundamental problems in social justice that Martha C. Nussbaum (2006, p. 3) still con-
siders to be unsolved problems. She is seeking to answer the question: How can we ex-
tend justice to all the world’s citizens? She reminds us that even the first international 
law theorist, Hugo Grotius, found that mutual dependence of states served as a basic 
premise for universal international law and that this was designed and aligned to cre-
ate an international community (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 18 ff). 
For Nussbaum, internationally recognized human rights have a contemporary ex-
planation in the capability approach she developed together with Amartya Sen. It holds 
to Kant’s theme that every person in an international community must be considered 
an end and not a means to the enrichment of others. Actions must then be taken on 
this basis (Nussbaum 2006, p. 70).
The central human capabilities to be protected by human rights include life, bodily 
integrity, imagination, emotions, ideas, affiliations with other humans and the control 
over one’s own environment, from which material and political participation rights 
emerge (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76 ff). In terms of ideas and social ethics, the capability 
approach has seen more refinement than the social contract theory used to explain hu-
man rights ever since they emerged. This theory states that this social contract is con-
cluded by the readily capable, which is why people with disabilities, foreigners and ani-
mals do not appear in this sort of conceptualization. 
The capability approach, however, makes it clear that the individual requires care 
and that this represents an asymmetrical social relationship. The culture of a soci-
ety can be determined primarily based on the extent to which it assures such needs 
(Nussbaum 2006, p. 168). In the capability approach, human rights are to be viewed 
as declarations of international guarantees of positive freedom (Nussbaum 2006, 
p. 284; the capability approach makes the significance of human rights clear) that, 
for their part, form the foundation of every state as well as the international com-
munity. This was prescribed to the states as well as the international community and 
given up to make them a reality. After all, liberty can be understood as an “opportu-
nity freedom” (Sen 2003, p. 29) determined by income and quality of life (Sen 2003, 
pp. 30 ff). Liberty requires institutions that create social opportunities and social se-
curity (Sen 2003, pp. 55 ff).
The welfare state’s goal
is to design the social institutions that will provide a nature of opportunity and employability for 
citizens, and will be attractive for these same reasons to international investors. What is good from 
the standpoint of justice—fair opportunities for all, a responsible sense of membership, an ethic of 
hard work and equal liberty—is also good for efficiency (Sen 2003, p. 70).
The liberty of the individual also forms the foundation for a social commitment. It is 
specifically directed towards using that liberty for the general good and for the next 
generation (Jordan 1998, p. 18). Economic and social freedoms do not oppose each 
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other, but rather require each other. One is merely the other expressed in different 
terms.6
Human rights no longer derive from state sovereignty but instead they set limits on 
the state and set the trend for sovereignty: A state is only a state of law if it heeds and 
respects human rights guaranteed and recognized internationally. The contemporary 
human rights formulated by the international community provide protection against 
more than just attacks during war, as the first guarantees as part of international hu-
manitarian law were about. They also protect against state overstep during times of 
peace (Sen 2003, N. 30, p. 29). The effects this has on the state are serious: “The rise of 
principle human rights causes both collusion and confluence between international and 
domestic law” (Sen 2003, p. 27).
All of these considerations are central to the situation for persons with disabilities; 
in this capacity, they provided an intellectual basis for the UNCRPD and, conversely, 
make it readily accessible to novel socio-philosophical debates and discussions.
Another peculiarity and occurrence must be noted in the development of social hu-
man rights: This leads to a relationship between equality and freedom. The dispute over 
fundamental social human rights to work, social security, welfare, accommodation, ed-
ucation and health (Nussberger 2005; Mikkola 2010; Becker, Pennings, Dijkhoff 2013; 
Lörcher 2016, p. 488) alone makes it clear that inequality inexorably leads to a loss of 
freedom—meaning that freedom and equality regularly go hand-in-hand together. The 
repudiation of workers’ rights and women’s rights in the early developmental phase of 
human rights meant a loss of rights in two senses—refused equality effects a loss of 
freedom. Securing both—freedom and equality—is the goal of fundamental social hu-
man rights for this very reason.
From that, there is a path that leads from bans on discrimination against individual 
groups of the potentially and currently disadvantaged to individual social human rights 
specifically necessary for that group to prevent affronts. In the context of the UNCRPD, 
these are the guarantees of universal accessibility (Art. 9 of the UNCRPD) and empow-
erment (Art. 26 of the UNCRPD).7 
3. Right to work 
The right to work is guaranteed as a human right in international and European law 
(Art. 23 of UDHR, 6 f. of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 1 European Social Charter and 15 Charter of the Rights and Freedom of the EU); 
6 In that same vein, at the European level, these are accompanied by the ECHR geared towards civil 
and political rights and the ESC targeted towards ensuring social rights (Seifert 2016, p. 591).
7 United Nations, Human Rights; office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Monitoring 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiues, Guidance for Human Rights’ Monitoring, 
Professional Training Series, No. 17; United Nations Report of the Cpommittee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, General Assembly, 17th session, Supplement No. A/70/55, New York 2015.
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therefore, every person has the right to work and is linked to a safe and secure work-
place. The German Basic Law (GG)does not generally express social rights, but it does 
guarantee the right of free choice of workplace in Art. 12 I GG. This encompasses more 
than the prohibition on forced labor in Art. 12 II GG The constitutions of some German 
states, such as Bavaria, Berlin and Thuringia, ascribe human labor an additional dimen-
sion as a fundamental and human right.
However, several factors notably obfuscate the debates regarding the right to work 
in Germany. For the most part, it is considered as an impossibility, because no one 
can “sue” for a specifically chosen place of work in a market economy and the “right to 
work” presumes that the state holds all of the jobs, which would, by necessity, be at the 
expense of all economic freedoms. These objections overlook the fact that social rights 
must not be misunderstood as a promise of happiness. The right to education does not 
make every person into a genius and the right to health does not make everyone fit. 
Social rights are always geared towards inclusion of the beneficiaries into existing so-
cial institutions. In the case of a right to work, the aim is inclusion in a working life or, 
in other words, the labor market in a market economy. 
Why should it be impossible to facilitate a human right to work in a market economy 
regulated in a social state? Labor law has employment rights for persons with disabili-
ties; anti-discrimination law provides claims for damages for lost income in the event 
that a potential employer refuses a hiring without cause and places sanctions on viola-
tions of bans against discrimination in this way. A claim such as this conceptually pre-
supposes the entitlement to establish an employment relationship. Social security has 
been designed to provide protection for individuals against unemployment, which has 
been a social risk for a century.
In addition, the right to work is formulated as an alternative to slavery and forced 
labor. After all, it focuses on admission to freely chosen work and specifically does not 
entail the public allotment of work. Those who claim that the right to work implies pub-
lic authority over work and the economy and promotes an “unfree society” are mistak-
ing the right to work as a civil liberty. Without this, it would not be possible to explain 
that labor administration, basic security and unemployment insurance have long been 
institutions that aim to bring unemployed people into working life. Hundreds of thou-
sands of people in Germany work in these institutions as case managers, educators, so-
cial workers, facilitators, debt counselors and therapists. German society spends count-
less billions of euros in these efforts year after year. Does this all happen for something 
that neither exists nor can exist?
In the post-war period, the right to work sought to ensure that every person capable 
of workwas included in recovery through work (Mikkola 2010, Note 37, p. 138 ff). The 
commitment to full employment serves as the guiding light for all employment poli-
cies (Mikkola 2010, p. 139). States are obligated to take part in economic policies that 
promote employment—employment exchange, employment promotion and unemploy-
ment insurance (Mikkola 2010, p. 140)—and in other suitable measures towards secur-
ing full employment (Mikkola 2010, p. 145). 
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The international and European regulations link the right to work regularly with the 
rights at work. Art. 12 I GG also gives employees a right to freely choose their employ-
er.8 The internationally recognized right to work also focuses on freely chosen work. It 
ensures a realistic opportunity to employment for every person as well as access to work 
without forced labor and free of discrimination or obstacles (Alston 2005, pp. 1, 3 ff). 
Therefore, the right to work creates neither an abstract duty to work nor an enforceable 
claim to a specific workplace of choice. 
Social rights are intended to enable legitimate autonomous action and, as a result, do 
not dictate that it must take place. This means there is no obligation to work from the 
right to work (Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 248 ff). Obligations result only from the observance 
of rights and only to the extent that they are necessary for realizing rights (Mundlak 2007, 
pp. 341, 356). The right to work actualizes the entitlement to employment. Directed at 
freely chosen work, it is designed neither to prohibit the work of others (McLachlan 
2005, p. 116; Krennerich 2013, pp. 162, 165 ff; judgment of the CJEU of 11 January 2000, 
C-285/98 (Kreil), ECLI:EU:C:2000:2) nor to grant a claim to the allotment of work.
The right to work encompasses a multitude of normative dimensions of employment. 
As a right to inclusion for everyone, it safeguards access to the labor market free of dis-
crimination of any kind (Ssenyonjo 2009, Note 45, pp. 284, 310; Krennerich 2013, Note 
47, p. 182), protects employees from and during unilateral, groundless dismissal by an 
employer (Kaufmann 2007, p. 33; Krennerich 2013, Note 47, p. 182), ensures a right to 
inclusion in a labor organization and when defining working conditions (Kaufmann 
2007, Note 49, p. 30; Ssenyonjo 2009, Note 45, pp. 310 ff; Krennerich 2013, Note 47, pp. 
180 ff), guarantees the right to the preservation of physical existence and bodily integ-
rity, requires a labor market organization with proof of employment and employment 
exchange, employment promotion and income from employment as a living wage that 
guarantees one’s livelihood (Krennerich 2013, Note 47, pp. 182 ff), and it, in turn, cre-
ates the basis for social security appropriate for the occurrence of various recognized 
social risks. 
4. Right to work and sweatshops for persons with severe handicaps
4.1. Role of swestshops für persons with severe handicaps 
In Germany since generations sweatshops for persons with severe handicaps do exist. 
As to § 56 of the Social Code IX these institutions have to develop, improve, unfold or 
restore the capabilities of persons with severe handicaps. They are addressed to persons, 
who are—depending on the manner and severity of their handicap—cannot be em-
ployed on the general labour market (§ 219 I of the Social Code IX). They should con-
tribute in sweatshops to a minimum standard of economic production (§ 219 II of the 
8 See in comparison and with information on the right to work: Papier 2006, §§ 30–18 ff.
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Social Code IX) and their transition into the general labour market should be supported 
(§ 219 I of the Social Code IX; Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, pp. 658 ff; Busch 2016, p. 561).
As to the German Monitoring Office for the UNCRPD, it is doubtful, on whether 
the 300 thousand persons with disabilities, who were active 2016 in Germany in more 
than 700 enterprises and 3 thousand locations, are treated in line with the right to work 
as to Art. 27 of the UNCRPD (Palleit 2016). As this Convention is transformed into 
the German law, all provisions for the protection of persons with handicaps should 
interpreted in the spirit, the main goals and the specific provisions of the Convention 
(Palleit 2017, pp. 64 ff).
4.2. Sweatshops and inclusion
The sweatshops are mainly critised of seperating persons with mental, physical or psy-
chological impairments from the majority of the working populationand and, hence, 
isolate them in special sheltered agencies. Such work would not satisfy, what Art. 27 
UNCRPD demands from the legislation. The salary received for this activity is also not 
sufficient for the recipients to afford an independent and dignified living. As to Art. 27 
of the UNCRPD the right to work implies a right to a fair and sufficient income out of 
work. This criticism shows strong similarities with the one directed against sheltered 
schooling (Sasse et al. 2019). Both pathss are built on an exclusive mindset towards per-
sons with impairments and this contrasts the overarching approach of the UNCRPD. 
The goal of the inclusion of persons with impairments, articulated and made mandatory 
by the UNCRPD is achieved, if persons with and without disabilities jointly learn and 
work. As long as this is not the case, politics have to reflect on how to react.
4.3. Consequences for the sweatshops
A proper answer is not to dissolve sweatshops. They offer work to persons with impair-
ments and create an opportunity for them, which would not be guaranteed in case of 
the dissolution of sweatshops. It is an illusion, that the persons working now in sweat-
shops could find easily a well-paid occupation on the general labour market. The activi-
ties carried out in the sweatshops give persons with handicaps the chance to give their 
daily life a structure and content; additionally, this activity offers the chance to social 
contacts and avoids social isolation. Nevertheless, the existing law in not in line with 
the UNCRPD demands. So, German legislation has to reflect on adequate steps to cope 
with the established international law standards.
The existing domestic law is probelamtic, as it conceives the work in sweatshops for 
severely handicapped persons as the general rule and the transition to the general labour 
market as an exemption. This principle collides with the principle, that no worker should 
be discrimanted because of disabilities. This implies the obligation to create work place, 
which concur with the handicapped worker’s abilities (Welti 2016, Anm. 52, pp. 635, 
649 ff). Even if not all persons with handicaps have a chance on the general labour market 
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(Porak 2020), “sheltered employment” can be accepted as a transitional measure for an 
interim period of time (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, pp. 652, 656), but not as a general rule. 
The UNCRPD prohibits to seperate persons with impairments categorically from the 
general labour markt and isolate them in special institutions (Palleit 2017, Note 54, p. 68).
Therefore, a roadmap for a reform is needed. Social rights are to be implemented 
progressively (Klee 2000; Lohmann 2000, p. 351; Eichenhofer 2012). As handicaps are 
individual and different, a differenciating approach to inclusion is not only permitted, 
but required and adequate (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, Note 58, pp. 657 ff). On the way 
to make inclusion progessively effective, it is not only necessary to take the economic 
potential of a given state into account, but also the social legacy within a state. If this 
legacy is to be corrected—as the ones of sheltered schooling and employment—a new 
approach should be instated within a prudently defined period of time. A reform pro-
cess must envisage the change to be implemented, without harming the protective effects 
which are created by the given legislation. The progression implemenetation clause is 
not only limited by the economic potential of the state, but by the socialpolicy traditions.
The progressive implementation clause urges, however, to develop a strategy for re-
form. Such a strategy is needed, but in the current German legislation it cannnot be 
identified. In the legislation sheltered employment is not a transitional and exceptional 
form of activities, but a stable one, and the transition from it to the general labour mar-
ket is not the normal, but an occasional one. Under Art. 27 of the UNCRPD this rule 
lacks ambition and, hence, cannot be justified. 
The Federal Association für Sweatshops for persons with severe handlicaps (BAG 
WfbM 2019) suggested 2019 many new steps: the handicapped should receive more 
trust in their abilities, their self-determination should be broadened and they should 
have more rights in the organization of the sweatshps working processes. In edition 
the efforts to strengthen education, rehabilitation, cultural and linguistic competences 
should be extended and expanded.
The sweatshops themselfes changed their character in the past:they started as insti-
tutions of care, today they are centre of production and economic progress. The more 
they take part in the economic life, the more the social integration of persons with dis-
abilities is feasible. It should be refected as to which degree the sweatshops themselves 
could be transformed into inclusive factories, which are open for all workers, irrespective 
of with or without disabilities (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, Note 58, p. 658). The sweat-
shops have also to compete with new forms of assisted labour market integration pro-
grammes, which had devlopped recently in the context of labour market (§ 130 of the 
Social Code III). A further light is to be shed on the working conditions in the sweat-
shops. It is necessary to adapt them more and more to the prevailing standards in the 
general labour market. As far as health and safety laws are concerned, this aim is already 
achieved. As to the wages, that gaps persist (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, Note 58, p. 662). 
A next step should be done approaching a salary, close to the minimum wage. As to 
the professional education a broader cooperation with other instiutions should be made 
possible (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, Note 58, pp. 659 ff; Busch 2016, Note 52, p. 575). 
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The necessity for an inclusive education is not to be restricted to schools, but it should 
be enlarged to all froms of education (Trenk-Hinterberger 2015, Note 58, p. 661). The 
sweatshops for persons with severe disabilities contributed to the well-being of persons 
with impairments considerably. But these efforts were based on strategy, which excluded 
the handicapped population from the general workforce. An inclusive labour market 
is the demand on Art. 27 of the UNCRPD; this brings about to strtansform the “sweat-
shops for persons with severe disabilities” into a place of inclusive work.
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